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Abstract
In a recent Brennan Center report, The New Era of Secret Law, Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein
articulates, examines, and evaluates the claims for and objections to secret law. Under this
banner, the report includes any law that is withheld from the public, regardless of whether
it may be shared among agencies or with certain members or committees of Congress.”
Goitein’s underlying goal is to propose procedural and substantive reforms. Secret Law is a
deeply-researched and highly valuable policy brief with an aim of making specific policy
recommendations. And readable to boot.
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DOCUMENTS
The New Era of Secret Law,
by Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein
Reviewed by Patrice McDermott

The new era of secret law, New York University School of Law, Brennan
Center for Justice, 2016 / 106 pp. /
https://www.brennancenter.org/publication/new-era-secret-law

In a recent Brennan Center report, The New Era of Secret Law,
Elizabeth (Liza) Goitein articulates, examines and evaluates both the claims
for and objections to secret law. Under this banner, the report includes “any
law that is withheld from the public, regardless of whether it may be shared
among agencies or with certain members or committees of Congress.”
Goitein’s underlying goal is to propose procedural and substantive reforms.
Goitein’s history is of central importance to the utility of this work.
She co-directs the Brennan Center for Justice’s Liberty and National Security
Program. Before coming to the Brennan Center, Ms. Goitein served as
counsel to Senator Feingold, Chairman of the Constitution Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, and as a trial attorney in the Federal
Programs Branch of the Civil Division of the Department of Justice. 1 This
1

Ms. Goitein is co-author of the Brennan Center’s reports Overseas Surveillance in an
Interconnected World, What Went Wrong with the FISA Court, and Reducing
Overclassification Through Accountability, and author of the chapter “Overclassification:
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background and the relationships she has developed with officials in the
Intelligence Community inform not only this research, but also her advocacy
on the issues addressed in it. This is not only a deeply-informed 2, and
informative, work but it also reflects Goitein’s principled advocacy stances.
The red cover indicates (according to the Center’s stated color scheme)
that it is a research reports offering in-depth empirical findings. 3 These
include interviews and discussions with Intelligence Community officials and
also FOIA requests submitted by the Brennan Center that allowed Goitein
(and her colleagues) to provide background and context. 4
Goitein’s report is intended to answer several critical questions that are
related to a central question: Is Secret law Necessary? Toward answering
this central inquiry, she asks: what do we mean when we refer to “secret
Its Causes and Consequences” in the book An Enduring Tension: Balancing National
Security and Our Access to Information. Her writing also has been featured in major
newspapers including The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, USA
Today, and LA Times, and she is a frequent commentator on MSNBC and NPR. Ms.
Goitein graduated from the Yale Law School and clerked for the Honorable Michael Daly
Hawkins on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
2

Goitein’s 469 endnotes cover 37-plus pages.

3 The Brennan Center attempted to discern the amount of secret law in certain categories;
they relied on a “combination of public documents, interviews and other communications
with government officials, and records obtained through FOIA. Discussing the “inherent
limitations of this process and the wild card of “unknown unknowns,”” Goitein states that
“there is no pretense that the resulting information presents a complete or precise
picture.” She further notes the obstacles to completeness: “Assembling comprehensive
statistics regarding the number of published versus unpublished legal pronouncements in
any given category would require government cooperation, if not participation.
Nonetheless, even the partial information the Center was able to obtain suggests that
secret law is more prevalent than many would imagine.” See page 28.
4

See, for example, pages 5, 6, 28, 39, 41, 47, 49, 52, 59, 61.
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law;” why secret law is of greater concern than other forms of government
secrecy that we tolerate and even condone; and how common is securitydriven secret law, and where else is it occurring? A central point is that the
rise of the national security state which emerged after World War II and
intensified after 9/11, has resulted for the first time in the systematic and
deliberate concealment of law.
A key, although certainly not sole,5 focus of Goitein’s report is national
security law. She asks, in confronting the various claims for the need for
secrecy in this area: Are there cases in which disclosure of rules or legal
interpretations, even with sensitive facts redacted, could harm national
security? How great is that risk, and how does it compare with the harms of
secret law? What procedural and substantive reforms could help ensure that
the public’s interests in both the transparency of laws and the security of the
nation are best served?
It is worth spending a few paragraphs looking at her Section C What’s Wrong with Secret Law? as many of the arguments that Goitein puts
forward throughout her examination of the why nots for secret law are
central to her analyses and to the reforms she proposes. The problems with
secret law are broken down into philosophical objections, constitutional
concerns, and practical harms. Under the first category, she cites
5

Goitein’s Table of Contents serves as a useful and detailed outline of the scope and
breadth of her discussions and arguments in the report. It can be viewed at
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/The_New_Era_of_Secret_
Law.pdf
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philosophers who have variously argued that publicity or public promulgation
is what gives law its moral legitimacy and authority. She quotes legal
theorist Lon Fuller in points that re-appear throughout the report:
The laws should . . . be given adequate publication so that they may
be subject to public criticism, including the criticism that they are
the kind of laws that ought not to be enacted unless their content
can be effectively conveyed to those subject to them. It is also plain
that if the laws are not made readily available, there is no check
against a disregard of them by those charged with their application
and enforcement.1
As Goitein notes, a non-public regulation is an autocratic whim and the
concept of a non-public regulation has particular force in democracies, where
the legitimacy of the law stems from the open democratic process that
generates it. Moreover, the secrecy of a law undermines not only the law’s
legitimacy, but also that of the lawmaker. She quotes the words of one
scholar: “[S]ecret law deprives the governor of his legitimacy, undermining
his right to rule.”2
In regard to constitutional concerns, she notes that the U.S.
Constitution includes surprisingly few express references — only two — to
openness or secrecy. Both references pertain to Congress. In essence, the
Constitution states that the proceedings of Congress generally must be
public, and its appropriations always must be public. Beyond this, the
Constitution contains no express commands to divulge — or powers to
conceal. As Goitein notes, however, many of our most cherished rights, and
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some of the government’s most important authorities, are not explicit in the
Constitution’s text. Courts, rather, have inferred them from ambiguous
language or derived them from the structure or purpose of various
provisions.3, 4The result to date, she notes, is that the constitutional right of
access to government information is a narrow one that applies almost
exclusively to court proceedings. Although there are Court indictments of
“secret law,” Goitein notes5 that they have been in the context of FOIA
cases, not constitutional challenges. Goitein nevertheless, identifies strong
arguments for why secret law violates the Constitution.
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,6 Chief Justice Warren Burger
opined that “[t]he First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and
the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting the
stock of information from which members of the public may draw.” In his
concurrence, Justice William Brennan, Jr. expounded on this idea, observing
that “the First Amendment embodies more than a commitment to free
expression and communicative interchange for their own sakes; it has a
structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of selfgovernment.” For this reason, it “entails solicitude not only for
communication itself; but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful
communication,” including access to government information.
In his opinion, Justice Brennan articulated a two-part test, later
adopted7 by the Supreme Court majority, for determining when the First
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Amendment supplies a right of access: courts should inquire whether there is
“an enduring and vital tradition of public entrée to particular proceedings or
information;” courts should ask “whether access to a particular government
process is important in terms of that very process.”8 Together, these are
known as the “experience and logic” test.
Goitein notes, though, that courts have struggled to determine
whether — or how — the two-part test applies outside the courtroom. As the
administrative state9 is a somewhat recent (historically speaking)
development, the “experience” prong becomes problematic in the context of
agency adjudications.10 Lower courts are split over whether the right of
access extends beyond the courts,11 and the Supreme Court has offered no
guidance or clarification. Many courts and scholars have taken the Court’s
long silence as suggesting that the right of access to judicial proceedings is
the exception, and that “[d]isclosure of government information generally is
left to the political forces that govern a democratic republic.” 12
In this discussion, Goitein expounds an argument that is central to her
view of secret law in a democracy:
The rationale underlying the First Amendment right of access to
judicial proceedings — i.e., that access helps “ensure that the
individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our
republican system of self-government”13 ... would clearly support a
First Amendment right of access to government pronouncements
having the force of law.
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Additionally, Goitein argues that, reading several provisions of the
Constitution together — including the First Amendment, the enumeration of
powers, the election provisions, and the Guarantee clause — one might posit
a broad public right to information about all kinds of government activity, as
secrecy “risk[s] subverting the Constitution’s unifying aim to create a
government of laws that would also be controlled by and responsive to the
people.”14
The “harms” concern is at the heart of Goitein’s project. She regularly
returns to the practical ways in which secret law subverts the rule of law. On
one front, when people are not aware of the rules their government must
follow,


They cannot hold the government accountable for violations of those
rules or otherwise assert their own legal rights against the
government15 ;



Indeed, they cannot even protest the abrogation of their rights 16;



It allows the government to develop unfair laws or to apply them an
unfair manner, safe in the knowledge that there will be no
repercussions17;



Government actors are, of course, aware of this de facto immunity.

Another harm resulting from secrecy is the creation and perpetuation
of bad law:


Secrecy inhibits the process by which law is made and refined — a
process that begins with public participation. The legislative process
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affords ample opportunity for stakeholders to express their views.


Secrecy – and lack of public participation – inhibits the development of
better–informed regulations. Congress passed the APA to require (at a
minimum) public notice and comment. The purpose was not to pay
deference to a theoretical public right. Rather, Congress believed that
input from the public — including experts outside of government and
people directly affected by the proposed measures — leads to betterinformed lawmaking and, thus, better laws.18
From another perspective, when laws are made without public

involvement — particularly when they are made by small groups of
government officials acting in secret — the result can be the entrenchment
of existing institutional norms, biases, and even mistakes. 19
From my perspective, her analysis of the Bush-Cheney Administration’s
subversions and evasions of law in the area of foreign intelligence
surveillance encapsulates the effects of secrecy and secret law on the ability
of the public – and much of Congress – to hold government accountable. As
Goitein makes clear, it was not only the Executive that escaped publicity and
accountability, but also the courts and the oversight committees in Congress.
The follow-on to the Snowden disclosures6 demonstrated vividly how far the
U.S. government had gone down a path of deeply secret law the purpose of
which was to circumvent statutory and constitutional limits on the
surveillance of U.S. persons. This path is a clear example of Daniel P.
Moynihan’s insights about a parallel regulatory regime:
6

I am using this terminology although it is important to note that Snowden himself did
not make any disclosures; he made the information available to journalists who chose,
with their editors, what to disclose.
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...”overregulation" is a continuing theme in American public life, as in
most modern administrative states. Secrecy would be such an issue,
save that secrecy is secret. Make no mistake, however. It is a parallel
regulatory regime with a far greater potential for damage if it
malfunctions.20
Goitein first discusses the Bush administration’s initiatives to develop
legal interpretations on torture and warrantless surveillance programs in her
discussion of the harms of secret law:
...the risk of developing ill-considered legal interpretations that reflect
institutional bias or “groupthink” is greater when only a handful of
executive officials are involved in formulating them. The opportunity to
correct such mistakes disappears when the law itself is kept within this
small group. Such close holds also prevent the other branches of
government from exercising their constitutional function of providing
checks and balances.7
Indeed, the administration came under criticism for relying on a small
cadre of like-minded officials. Time after time, “[t]he policymaking process
was...rigged to block informational pathways that could have subjected deep
secrets to additional forms of scrutiny and revision.”21 In one famous
example, cited by Jack Goldsmith (who led the Justice Department’s Office of
Legal Counsel under President Bush), the Department of Justice refused to
share its legal justification for the NSA’s warrantless surveillance programs
with the NSA’s General Counsel.22
While it is often argued that disclosures were made to congressional
oversight committees, Goitein notes that these raise the question of how
7

See page 10.
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effective secret legislative oversight can be. The calculus of congressional
accountability (and that of individual members) changes when oversight
happens behind closed doors. Goldsmith has noted that intelligence
committees have little incentive to pick secret battles with the executive
branch on national security issues: there are no political rewards to these
fights — no victories to splash across constituent newsletters, no legislative
favors to dole out to donors, but there are political risks: if a terrorist attack
were to occur, any actions members had taken to limit the executive
branch’s exercise of national security authorities surely would come to
light.23
To the question whether secret law is inevitable – particularly when
legal opinions are (or are claimed to be) intermingled with legitimately secret
operational details (“the entanglement of legal analysis with classified fact”),
Goitein responds that after several FISA Court opinions were made public by
Snowden and (in response) by the Director of National Intelligence, that
court began writing at least some of its opinions with an eye toward public
disclosure — a practice that will likely become standard now that the USA
Freedom Act requires the release of a redacted or summarized version of all
significant FISA Court opinions.
Goitein also addresses the claim that the efficacy of surveillance
programs depends on concealing, not just the identities of particular targets,

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/10
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.010210

10

McDermott: New Era of Secret Law

but the programs’ very existence.8 This was the claim behind the secrecy of
President Bush’s warrantless wiretapping program. When the general
framework of this program was made public through leaks, however, Goitein
notes that the executive branch did not abandon it on the ground that its
efficacy had been compromised. Instead, the administration pushed to have
the program continued under public laws. Congress obliged, codifying the
program in Section 702 of FISA, and executive officials continue to tout its
effectiveness.24 Similarly, the bulk collection of Americans’ phone records,
which was kept secret allegedly to preserve its utility, was replaced with a
narrower program designed to accomplish the same end. As she points out,
the rules for the new program are contained in public law, yet their publicity
did not affect the administration’s assessment that the program would
provide the intelligence establishment with the tools it needs. 25
Due to the constraints of length, I am regretfully relegating Goitein’s
reform recommendations to a footnote.9 This is not to imply they do not
8
9

See page 25.
The report recommends six reforms that could rein in secret law across all three
branches: 1) Decisions to withhold legal rules and authoritative legal interpretations from
the public should be made by an inter-agency body of senior officials; 2) The standard for
keeping law secret should be more stringent than the current standard for classifying
information. Legal rules and authoritative legal interpretations should be withheld only if
it is highly likely that their disclosure would result, either directly or indirectly, in loss of
life, serious bodily harm, or significant economic or property damage; 3) Certain
categories of law should never be secret. The disclosure of pure legal analysis, containing
no sensitive facts, cannot harm national security. Legal interpretations that purport to
exempt the executive branch from compliance with statutes or that stretch statutory
terms beyond their ordinary meanings also should not be secret; 4) When the executive
branch issues secret law, it should immediately share the law with the other branches
and with independent oversight bodies; 5)Indefinite secret law is constitutionally
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merit attention and discussion; they are, after all, the policy arguments to
which her report builds. I hope, though, that - with limited space - the
review above of a small portion of the assessments and analyses on which
she builds her case will entice the reader to turn to Goitein’s admirable
report (and to turn students and colleagues to it). It is, in essence, a deeplyresearched and highly valuable policy brief with an aim of making specific
policy recommendations. And readable to boot.

intolerable. There should be a four-year time limit on the secrecy of legal rules and
authoritative legal interpretations. Renewals should require the unanimous approval of
the inter-agency body charged with making secrecy determinations. Two renewals should
be permitted, creating an effective 12-year ceiling on the secrecy of laws; 6) Americans
should know how much secret law exists and the general areas where it is being applied.
Each government body producing secret law should be required to make public an index
that lists all of the secret rules and interpretations by date, general subject matter, and
any other information that can be made available.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/10
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.010210

12

McDermott: New Era of Secret Law
1 Lon L. Fuller, The morality of law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 59.
2 Christopher Kutz, “Secret law and the value of publicity,” 22 Ratio Juris 197, 211 (2009) at 212.
3 Adam M. Samaha, “Government secrets, constitutional law, and platforms for judicial
intervention,” 53 UCLA L. Rev. 909, 916 (2006).
4 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711 (1974). The Supreme Court... has recognized an
“executive privilege” that shields communications between the president and close advisors,
stating, “Nowhere in the Constitution . . . is there any explicit reference to a privilege of
confidentiality, yet to the extent this interest relates to the effective discharge of a President’s
powers, it is constitutionally based.” Similarly, the Court has read Article II as according the
president implied authority to control access to national security information in certain contexts.
See Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 527 (1988).
5 See infra Part II.B.2.
6 Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575-76 (1980).
7 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604-06 (1982).
8 Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
9 Goitein is referencing the proliferation of new agencies, issuing social and economic regulations
and adjudicating the rights of private parties in the first part of the 20th century which resulted in
a new kind of law. At first, there was no legal requirement for publication of agency regulations
and decisions, and no system for registering or distributing them. [Harold C. Relyea, “The Federal
Register: Origins, formulation, realization, heritage,” 28 Gov’t Info. Q. 295, 296-97 (2011)].
The public and even government officials were often in the dark as to the enactment and repeal of
specific administrative laws [Erwin. N. Griswold, “Government in ignorance of the law — A plea for
better publication of executive legislation,” 48 Harv. L. Rev. 198, 204-05 (1934)]. The system was
so confused that the government Lawmakers addressed these problems with a trio of laws,
beginning in 1935 with the Federal Register Act, [Federal Register Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74220, 49 Stat. 500 (1935) (current version at 44 U.S.C. § 1501-1511)] which requires all rules and
regulations to be published in an official periodical known as the Federal Register. The other two
laws were the Administrative Procedures Act and the Freedom of Information Act.
10 See Heidi Kitrosser, “Secrecy in the immigration courts and beyond: Considering the right to
know in the administrative state,” 39 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 95, 118 (2004) (discussing how
courts have handled the “experience” prong in light of “the relative modernity of most
administrative proceedings”).
11See id. at 118 & nn.130-34; see also Samaha, supra,at 944-45 & nn.163-64.
12 Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 934 (D.C. Cir. 2003); see also
David E. Pozen, “Deep Secrecy,” 62 Stan. L. Rev. 257, 339 (2010), at 319-20.
13 Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 604 (1982).
14 Pozen, supra note xii, at 300.
15 Dakota Rudesill, “Coming to terms With secret law,” 7 Harv. Nat’l Sec. J. 241 (2016), at 32324.
16 Samaha, supra note iii, at 917-18.

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

13

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 10

17 See Claire Grant, “Secret Laws,” 25 Ratio Juris 301, 314 (2012); Rudesill, supra note xv, at
317.

18 See Chocolate Mfrs. Ass’n v. Block, 755 F.2d 1098, 1103 (4th Cir. 1985); Arthur Earl Bonfield,
“Military and foreign affairs function rule-making under the APA,” 71 Mich. L. Rev. 221, 222
(1972).
19 See Bonfield, supra, at 223; Rudesill, supra note xv, at 311.
20 In “Chairman’s foreword” to the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
(1997) https://fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html. Thanks to Susan Maret, for
highlighting this in her Introduction to Government secrecy: Classic and contemporary readings,
Susan Maret and Jan Goldman, eds., Libraries Unlimited, Westport CT, 2004, xxiii.
21 Pozen, supra note xii, 339.
22 Jack Goldsmith, The Terror presidency: Law and judgment inside the Bush Administration (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 181-82.
23 Jack Goldsmith, Power and constraint: The accountable presidency after 9/11 (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2012), 91-92.
24 Oversight and reauthorization of the FISA amendments act: The balance between national
security, privacy,and civil liberties: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 49 (2016) (testimony of Hon. Matthew G. Olsen, President, IronNet Cybersecurity),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-10-16%20Olsen%20Testimony.pdf
25 Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, Statement of
administration policy: HR 2048 — USA FREEDOM Act (May 12, 2015),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/sap/114/saphr2048h_20150512.p
df

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/10
DOI: 10.31979/2377-6188.2018.010210

14

